Supreme Court Hears Argument on Stale Claims and FDCPA

As reported on our blog (here and here), the Eleventh Circuit ruled that filing a time barred proof of claim does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, an issue which has divided courts and Courts of Appeals. The Supreme Court heard argument on this issue on January 17, 2017. The transcript can be found here.

The advocates faced some tough question about the issues presented as well as the spirit and purpose of the Bankruptcy Code itself. This is bound to be an interesting opinion. We will keep you posted.

For any assistance with filing claims in bankruptcy cases, contact Preti Flaherty’s Bankruptcy, Creditors’ Rights, and Restructuring Practice Group.

Anthony Manhart is a Partner at Preti Flaherty and serves as Co-Chair of the Bankruptcy, Creditors' Rights and Restructuring Group. His practice focuses on bankruptcy and creditors' and debtors' rights, representation of Chapter 7 trustees and various parties in formal insolvency and collection proceedings and out-of-court workouts. He also serves on the Panel of Chapter 7 Trustees for the District of Maine.

Trustee Lacks Standing to Assert Legal Malpractice Claims on Behalf of Debtors

The Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court (Panos, J.) dismissed an adversarial proceeding complaint brought against debtor’s counsel which alleged legal malpractice. The trustee alleged that debtor’s counsel committed malpractice and asserted that the legal malpractice claims are assets of the bankruptcy estate. Debtor’s counsel moved to dismiss. After a hearing, the Court granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that the alleged malpractice claims were not property of the bankruptcy estate and that the trustee therefore lacked standing to assert them.

In the adversarial complaint, the trustee alleged that because debtor’s counsel failed to instruct his client to record a declaration of homestead, the debtor was only able to claim a Massachusetts homestead exemption in the amount of $125,000. Had a declaration of homestead been recorded prepetition, the debtor would have been able to claim a $500,000 exemption, which would have immunized him from a judgment obtained by the bankruptcy trustee. The trustee further claimed that by converting the case from a chapter 13 to a chapter 7 bankruptcy rather than having the matter dismissed and re-filed, the debtor missed an opportunity to have additional debt discharged.

In addressing the issue of the homestead claim, the Court ruled that the trustee lacked standing to bring his claim where the claims are not property of the estate but rather post-petition property. The Court noted that Section 541(a)(1) provides that commencing a bankruptcy case “creates an estate [that includes] all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." Therefore, until the debtor filed his chapter 13 petition, no purported malpractice had yet accrued where no harm had yet been suffered by the failure to record the declaration of homestead. Accordingly, the claim did not exist until after the estate was created and therefore was post-petition property belonging to the debtor.

Moving on to the claim arising from the conversion of the case from a chapter 13 to a chapter 7 bankruptcy case, the Court similarly held that the claim was also not the property of the estate. Here, the Court found that the negligence which occurred during the pendency of the bankruptcy case logically could not have existed before the bankruptcy case commenced. Therefore, the earliest this claim could have accrued was upon conversion. Consequently, the Court held that “this was not a claim rooted in any way in the pre-bankruptcy past” and that the harmed caused by the malpractice “is entangled with [the debtor’s] ability to make a fresh start.” The Court therefore concluded that the trustee lacked standing to pursue the legal malpractice claim.

This case should remind practitioners to carefully consider the issue of standing whenever analyzing an adversarial proceeding claim. It also serves as a good reminder to all counsel that homeowners should record a declaration of homestead to be eligible take advantage of the heightened exemption amount available under Massachusetts law if things go south.

Matthew Libby is an associate in Preti Flaherty's Litigation Group, practicing from the firm's Boston office. He represents clients in commercial litigation and bankruptcy matters.

Changes to Bankruptcy Rule 3002.1 Affect Mortgage Lenders

Almost every year, changes are implemented to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. On December 1, 2016, this year’s changes to the Bankruptcy Rules went into effect. The changes include revisions to Bankruptcy Rule 3002.1.

Bankruptcy Rule 3002.1 requires secured creditors with an interest in the debtor’s principal residence, such as mortgage lenders, to periodically file notices of payment change in Chapter 13 cases. The changes to Bankruptcy Rule 3002.1 clarify when a secured creditor must file a payment change notice. The amended rule requires that a secured creditor file a payment change notice on all claims secured by the debtor’s primary residence for which a debtor or Chapter 13 Trustee is making post-petition payments during the bankruptcy, regardless of whether the debtor is curing a pre-petition mortgage.

Additionally, the amendments to Bankruptcy Rule 3002.1 clarify that the obligation to file a payment change notice ceases once the creditor obtains relief from the automatic stay.

Preti Flaherty frequently represents creditors in bankruptcy cases in Maine, Massachusetts and New Hampshire. For assistance with claims in bankruptcy cases, contact Preti Flaherty’s Bankruptcy, Creditors’ Rights & Business Restructuring Practice Group.

Bodie B. Colwell practices as an associate with Preti's Bankruptcy, Creditors’ Rights and Business Restructuring group from the Portland office. She focuses on supporting bankruptcy, insolvency, and creditors’ rights clients.

Eleventh Circuit Decides Surrender Means Just That

In the recent opinion of In re Failla, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that when a debtor indicates in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy schedules case that she or he intends to “surrender” property subject to a secured claim, the debtor can’t renege on that commitment. The Court of Appeals therefore affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order requiring the debtors to cease opposition to a secured creditor’s subsequent foreclosure of the surrendered property.

The Faillas indicated in their Chapter 7 Statement of Intention that they intended to surrender their residence, which was worth less than the mortgage loan it secured. The Chapter 7 trustee then abandoned the property, and the mortgage lender commenced foreclosure proceedings. The Faillas, who were still living in the house, filed state court pleadings contesting the foreclosure. Rather than simply seeking bankruptcy stay relief and proceeding in state court, the mortgage lender sought relief in the bankruptcy court, asserting that the debtors had surrendered their rights to the property, and had no right to contest the foreclosure. The bankruptcy court agreed and entered an order directing the Faillas to cease opposition to the foreclosure, failing which the court would revoke their Chapter 7 discharge.

The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling, as did the Court of Appeals. Taking a dim view of the Debtors’ behavior, the Court reasoned that a § 521 “surrender” was a relinquishment of the debtor’s rights in the property to the bankruptcy trustee and the creditor, and that if the trustee then abandons the property, the surrendering debtor must “get out of the creditor’s way.” Noting that a debtor should not be able to “undo his surrender” by opposing the foreclosure in state court after having obtained a discharge in bankruptcy, the Court stated that “[i]n bankruptcy, as in life, a person does not get to have his cake and eat it too.”

For any assistance with secured claims in bankruptcy cases, contact Preti Flaherty’s Bankruptcy, Creditors’ Rights, and Restructuring Practice Group.

Supreme Court to Rule on Stale Claims and FDCPA

As reported on our blog, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that filing a time barred proof of claim does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, an issue which has divided courts and Courts of Appeals. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the case of Midland Funding LLC v. Johnson. (See here.)  Presumably, this will resolve the circuit split on the issue and provide guidance for creditors and debtors on this tough issue.

Stay tuned. We will report back after the Supreme Court rules.

For any assistance with filing claims in bankruptcy cases, contact Preti Flaherty’s Bankruptcy, Creditors’ Rights, and Restructuring Practice Group.

Bankruptcy is Romantic: Maine Bankruptcy Court Holds That a Debtor’s Interest in Her Engagement Ring is Exempt

Recently, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maine held that a debtor’s interest in an engagement ring is exempt under Maine law. In re Cynthia A. Chaney, Case No. 15-20725. In that case, the debtor claimed the full value of her wedding and engagement rings, valued at $5,200, as exempt under Maine law. The Chapter 7 Trustee in the case objected, arguing that Maine law allows an exemption in jewelry up to a maximum value of $750. 

In Maine, a debtor may claim an exemption in the debtor’s “aggregate interest, not to exceed $750 in value, in jewelry primarily for personal family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor and the debtor’s interest in a wedding ring and an engagement ring.” 14 M.R.S. §4422(4). The Trustee argued, based on legislative history and his reading of the surrounding provisions, that this language limited any exemption in any jewelry to $750 total, including wedding and engagement rings. The debtor argued that the statute created two categories of jewelry: personal jewelry with an aggregate value of $750, and a wedding ring and an engagement ring of unlimited value. 

The Bankruptcy Court found the language of the statute to be unambiguous: 

It allows debtors to protect two separate types of jewelry: (1) personal jewelry and (2) two rings connected to the institution of marriage. . . . The first category has a limit: debtors can exempt up to $750 of jewelry held primarily for personal family or household use. The second group has no limit: debtors are permitted to protect their full interest in a wedding ring and an engagement ring.

From the opinion, it is clear that in Maine a debtor can claim an exemption in two marital rings of unlimited value. Other New England states have different exemption limits for jewelry. For example, Massachusetts allows the debtor to elect either the Massachusetts state exemptions or the federal exemptions. Only the federal exemption has an exemption for jewelry—up to $1,600 in value (value adjusted on April 1, 2016). In New Hampshire, a debtor may exempt jewelry up to a value of $500. NH RSA 511:2. In New Hampshire, a debtor can also apply his or her “wildcard” exemption to protect jewelry with value above the $500 exemption.

Court Finds that Parents Convicted of Ponzi Scheme Received Value from Tuition Payments

Do parents receive something of value when they pay for their child to attend college? The Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court (Hoffman, J.) recently considered this exact question in DeGiamcomo v. Sacred Heart University, Inc., AP No. 15-01126 (August 10, 2016). In this case, after the debtor’s parents were convicted of investment fraud for operating a Ponzi scheme, a Chapter 7 trustee attempted to avoid and recover over $60,0000 in tuition payments made to an area college as fraudulent transfers under Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(1)(B) and the Massachusetts Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 109A. 

The trustee asserted that the “Ponzi scheme presumption” should have been applied, where, as the trustee claimed, the parents were insolvent at the time of the transfers and “received no reasonably equivalent value” from the college. The Ponzi scheme presumption is applicable where “the existence of a Ponzi scheme establishes that transfers were made with the intent to hinder, delay and defraud creditors.” Picard v. Merkin (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC), 440 B.R. 243, 255 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). The Court, however, rejected the trustee’s argument and applied a more narrow view of the presumption. The Court held that only transfers made in furtherance of the Ponzi scheme are subject to the presumption of fraudulent intent. Otherwise, the Court reasoned, funds spent buying groceries, payment medical bills, or supporting children would be subject to a trustee’s claw back.

Turning to the question of whether or not the debtor parents received any “value” for making tuition payments on behalf of their child, the Court noted that other jurisdictions have split on the issue: some holding that there is a “societal expectation that parents will assist” with college payments and denying attempts at a claw back, while other jurisdictions have held that tuition payments were avoidable where the parents had no legal obligation to pay the tuition. Here, the Court determined that the debtor parents did indeed receive something of value for the tuition payments other than mere “ethereal or emotional rewards.” The Court held that “[a] parent can reasonably assume that paying for a child to obtain an undergraduate degree will enhance the financial well-being of the child, which in turn will confer an economic benefit on the parent.” This “quid pro quo” was enough for the Court to deny the trustee’s attempt to claw back the tuition payments and enter summary judgment in favor of the college. 

As an interesting side note to the case, after the trustee appealed the ruling, the Bankruptcy Court Judge Hoffman filed a statement requesting direct appeal to the First Circuit. Assuming the First Circuit takes the appeal, we will see if the First Circuit agrees with the Bankruptcy Court’s analysis.